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CARRON v. McMAHON: THE WIDENING
SCOPE OF THE POLITICAL OFFENSE
EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION
I. INTRODUCTION
A state is obligated to return fugitive offenders to the place
of their crime when it enters into an extradition treaty with that
country.' However, extradition treaties may contain grounds for
legitimately refusing extradition, such as the political offense ex-
ception.' Two categories of crimes may be considered political
offenses: "pure" offenses which are solely political acts3 and "re-
lated" offenses which are criminal acts assimilated with a politi-
cal act.4 In addition, another criminal offense may be so closely
associated with either type of political offense that the criminal
offense becomes a "connected" political offense in the eyes of
the judiciary.5 The policy which underlies the political offense
exception is based on three concerns:' humanitarian issues Jthe
principle of neutrality,8 and the international public order.'
1. A state may choose to limit its right to grant asylum by the express acceptance of
legal obligations. States elect to limit their sovereignty in order to regulate their relations
with other states. The modern era of interdependent states has curtailed absolute sover-
eignty. SATYA DEVA BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 30-31
(1968).
Customary international law imposes no obligation upon a state to surrender
fugitives accused of a crime unless it has contracted to do so . . . . It is a
reasonable exercise of its exclusive right of jurisdiction within its own domain,
and a state is believedto violate no legal duty in declining, in the absence of a
treaty, to surrender a fugitive criminal found within its territory to any de-
manding state. [citations omitted]
Id. at 34.
2. Political, military and fiscal offenses are-grounds for denying extradition relating
to the offense charged. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 368 (1974); see also ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL AsyLuM 15 (1980).
3. CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO ExTRADI-
TION 2-3 (1980).
4. Id. at 108-10.
5. Id. at 110.
6. Id. at 106-08.
7. The possibility of unfair judicial treatment in the requesting state raises concerns
about the rights of the fugitive offender. Id.
8. States may prefer to grant asylum to political offenders to remain neutral; other-
wise, an inquiry into the political crime may be perceived as a judgment about the politi-
cal situation in the requesting state. This is not desirable when governments may change
and the requested state wishes to remain on good terms with new governments of the
requesting state. Id.
9. Political offenses are thought to violate only the domestic public order, since they
are aimed at one state's government rather than at the international public order. Id.
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The ancient concept of asylum was one of protecting indi-
viduals from extraterritorial prosecution for common crimes.10
In the eighteenth century, this concept was enlarged to include
political offenses when the Aierican and French revolutions"
established the right to rebel.12 Shortly thereafter, the political
offense exception was codified in an extradition treaty in 183311
and subsequently was incorporated into extradition treaties
adopted by most western countries.14
Despite its wide usage, the term "political offense" remains
largely undefined in treaties. 5 At best treaties may contain neg-
ative definitions which exclude certain crimes from being consid-
ered political offenses.' Without clear guidelines from treaties
or legislatures as to what constitutes a political offense, the judi-
ciary is given ample discretion to determine whether a fugitive
offender has committed a political offense.
In Carron v. McMahon, 8 the Irish Supreme Court estab-
lished a new test for connected political offenses and thereby af-
firmed a recent lenient posture in extradition cases. Extradition
to Northern Ireland was denied in this case because the Court
found that the defendant committed a connected political of-
fense based solely on his identical actus reus with a political of-
fender. This was the only basis of a connection because the de-
fendant had neither the mens rea nor any political motivations
for the crime. Whereas only disparity of action between the of-
10. Id. at 4-5.
11. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 792-93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
271 (1986) which discusses the following: The Declaration of Independence states "when-
ever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the
people to alter or abolish it. . ." para. 1 (U.S. 1776); similarly, La preamble de la Con-
stitution de 1791 (Fr.), reprinted in LES CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, 33
(S. Godechat ed. 1970) declares an inalienable right "la resistance a l'oppression."
12. See also VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 3, at 8-9 (discussing the effect of the
French Revolution).
13. The Belgian Extradition Act of October 1, 1833. See Research in International
Law Under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School, 29 AM. J. INT'L L.
113, 362-63 (Special Supplement 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research].
14. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 3, at 1.
15. Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of
Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226 (1962); IVAN ANTHONY SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 169 (1971).
16. War crimes, genocide, terrorism, attempts on the lives of heads of state, and
crimes involving bombs and automatic weapons have all been excluded from designation
as political offenses in various treaties. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 3, at 2.
17. BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 371.
18. Carron v. McMahon [1990] I.R. 239.
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fenses would previously have been permitted under a finding of
connected political offense, the precedent set by this decision al-
lows disparity of intent between the political offense and the
connected crime.
The basis of this decision was a new test for connected of-
fenses which examines the proximity of the connected offense to
the political offense, in addition to the political element of the
connected offense. In light of other recent extradition cases, it is
clear that the Irish Supreme Court adopted a low standard for
the political offense exception because of a changing view of
what constitutes "political" activity and humanitarian concerns
for the offender. However, the leniency of this test widens the
political offense exception so greatly that the "good faith" prin-
ciple of honoring treaties appears to have been circumvented.'
This perceived breach jeopardizes relations between the Repub-
lic of Ireland on the one hand and Great Britain and Northern
Ireland on the other hand.
This Comment argues, however, that lowering the standard
for connected political offenses has not come at the expense of
the good faith principle in the Anglo-Irish Extradition Agree-
ment. Courts are given discretion to invoke any test for deter-
mining whether a criminal offense is a political offense2" and the
good faith principle only requires fair application of the test
pursuant to the treaty.2' In Carron the Irish Supreme Court cre-
ated a low, but discriminating, standard for the political offense
exception and fairly applied it under the extradition agreement.
Notwithstanding the court's good faith, it would benefit the Re-
public of Ireland to expose criminal offenders who escape extra-
dition to judicial proceedings in their country.22 Without such
action the Republic of Ireland may be perceived as attempting
to avoid international responsibility.
This Conment will examine the political offense exception
as it is applied in Carron v. McMahon in light of British and
Irish statutory and case law. These states' common goal of
19. Pacta sunt servanda is the international law principle that treaties will be
honored. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 496 (1966).
20. "The courts must ascertain the degree of connection between the common crime
and the political act . . . [T]he degree of connection required for the entire act to be
political, and thus non-extraditable, depends entirely on the test adopted by each indi-
vidual country." Garcia-Mora, supra note 15, at 1239.
21. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 2, at 37.
22. The principle of au dedere aut judicare (extradite or try) advocates such action.
See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 3, at 7-8.
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preventing terrorism and their points of divergence in regard to
the political offense exception will be discussed. Recent case law,
including the Carron decision, prevents extraditions to Great
Britain and Northern Ireland through the political offense ex-
ception and a civil liberties defense. This Comment explores rea-
sons for preventing extraditions to those states and raises poten-
tial problems with the new posture of the Supreme Court of
Ireland toward the political offense exception.
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND ON EXTRADITION
From 1801 until 1922, the entire island of Ireland was part
of the British Commonwealth.2 3 During that time period Great
Britain first opposed extradition of political offenders24 and en-
acted the Extradition Act of 1870 which reserved the right not
to extradite them.25 However, the Extradition Act of 1870 did
not apply to extradition requests between Great Britain and Ire-
land. Instead, a warrant system between the states facilitated
extradition.26
In 1965 reciprocal legislation was implemented in the Re-
public of Ireland 27 and Great Britain 28 to update the backing of
warrants system.29 The language regarding the political offense
exception differs in the two pieces of legislation. Great Britain's
Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland Act 1965) reiterates
23. In January 1922 the Irish Parliament accepted the Anglo-Irish Treaty which es-
tablished independent rule in the Irish Free State. The Irish Free State was comprised of
the 26 southern counties of the Irish island. The four northern counties remained under
British rule. See W. ALISON PHILLIPS, THE REVOLUTION IN IRELAND 26-27, 233 (1923).
24. See 1 V.E. HARTLEY BOOTH, BRITISH EXTRADITION LAW AND PROCEDURE 73-75
(1980).
25. The Extradition Act of 1870 stated "a fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered
if the offense in respect of which his surrender is demanded is one of a political character
or if he proves. . . that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a
view to try to punish him for an offense of a political character." 33 & 34 Vict. ch. 52,
3(1).
26. Indictable Offenses Act 1848, 11 & 12 Vict. ch. 42; Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act
1851, 14 & 15 Vict., ch. 93. Under the backing of warrants system, one state issued a
warrant for a fugitive offender which was executed in the other state. See HARTLEY
BOOTH, supra note 24, at 209-12.
27. The Extradition Act of 1965, No. 17 (Ir.).
28. The Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965, C 45 (Gr. Br.).
29. The backing of warrants system was updated because the Republic of Ireland
questioned the continuing validity of a practice which preexisted its independence [see
Paul O'Higgins, The Irish Extradition Act 1965, 15 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 369 (1966)] and
to facilitate the large number of extraditions between the two countries, see HARTLEY
BOOTH, supra note 24, at 212.
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the wording of the Extradition Act of 1870 with regard to politi-
cal offenders. It states that warrants for "offenses of a political
character" 30 are not extraditable. Ireland's Extradition Act of
1965 states that extradition will be refused for "a political of-
fense or an offense connected to a political offense." 31 The differ-
ence in wording gives the Irish law a broader scope despite the
intention for the reciprocal legislation to have the same effect.32
The reciprocal legislation of 1965 regarding extradition was
amended in 1987 to give effect to the European Convention on
the Suppression of Terrorism.3 Ireland enacted the Extradition
(European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) Act in
1987, which restricted the political offense exception by explic-
itly excluding offenses "involving the use of an explosive or an
automatic firearm, if such use endangers persons." 34 Although
the political offense exception was narrowed, an additional safe-
guard was included in an amendment of the 1987 Extradition
Act. This provision requires that the Attorney General conclude
that the intention to prosecute the fugitive offender was founded
upon sufficient evidence before signing the extradition warrant.
3 5
This requirement of presenting a prima facie case before extra-
diting the offender was not included in the 1965 Extradition
Act.3 6 The restricted definition of political offenses was consid-
ered necessary to discourage specific forms of terrorism.
III. CASE LAW
A. Great Britain
British case law developed the "political incidence" theory
in decisions regarding the political offense exception to extradi-
tion. 7 Under this theory, an offense has a "political character" if
it was committed during a political disturbance and was inciden-
30. Section 2(2).
31. No. 17 of 1965 Part III, 50.
32. Alexander McCall-Smith & Philip Magee, The Anglo-Irish Law Enforcement
Report in Historical and Political Context, 1975 CRIM. L. REv. 200, 206-07 [hereinafter
McCall-Smith]. Margaret McGrath, Extradition: Another Irish Problem, 34 N.I.L.Q.
292, 298 (1984).
33. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ.
T.S. 90 (entered into force Aug. 4, 1978).
34. No. 1 of 1987, § 3.
35. Extradition (Amendment) Act 1987, § 2(1).
36. See O'Higgins, supra note 29, at 390-92.
37. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 3, at 111. See generally SHEARER, supra note
15, at 170-71.
1992] 639
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tal to and in furtherance of the disturbance.3 In its original
form, 9 this test is extremely objective40 because it considers the
context of the offense, but not the motivation for it.
41
The first extradition case decided under the Extradition Act
of 1870 was Re Castioni.42 It concerned Switzerland's request for
the extradition of a Swiss national who killed a man during a
political uprising in Switzerland and fled to Great Britain. Ex-
tradition was refused because under the political incidence test
the murder was "incidental to and formed part of a political
disturbance.
43
The political incidence test was later refined to exclude acts
of anarchy in In re Meunier.44 The "political disturbance" ele-
ment was narrowed to acts committed during political distur-
bances between two or more political parties. 45 Anarchy and ter-
rorism are not recognized as political parties and thus offenses
committed in their names cannot qualify for the political offense
exception to extradition.46
The "incidental" element of the political incidence theory
was liberally defined in R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex
parte Kolczynski.47 A common crime was found to be an offense
of political character because "the revolt of the crew was to pre-
vent themselves from being prosecuted for a political offense. '48
38. This definition was supplied by Mr. Justice Stephen, who subsequently judged
the Castioni case. See Re Castioni [1891] 1 Q.B. 149. His definition was preferred over
John Stuart Mill's definition that a political offense was any offense committed in the
course of or furthering a civil war, insurrection or riot. SHEARER, supra note 15, at 169-
70.
39. See discussion infra of Castioni and Muenier.
40. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 3, at 111.
41. In later cases the British Courts began to assess motive to a slight degree. VAN
DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 3, at 115.
42. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
43. Id. at 165-66; see James Fitzjames Stephen, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 71 (1883).
44. [1894] Q.B. 415.
45. "There must be two or more parties in the state, each seeking to impose the
government of their choice on the other." The offenses must be committed "in pursuance
of that object," not in pursuance of anarchy which is "the enemy of all governments." Id.
at 419.
46. See Charles L. Cantrell, The Political Offense Exception in International Ex-
tradition: A Comparison of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ire-
land, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 777, 786 (1977).
47. In this case Polish sailors aboard a ship wrested control from their superiors and
brought the ship to an English port, where they requested asylum. [1955] 1 Q.B. 540,
542.
48. The sailors were charged with mutiny, a common crime, but if returned to Po-
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Citing "reasons of humanity" the court widened the incidental
element to include indirect acts against a totalitarian
government.49The relationship between the state and the offender was ex-
amined in Schtraks v. Government of Israel.50 The court held
that the individual must be at odds with the state requesting
extradition in order for his offense to be a political offense. 51
The fugitive and the state are seen as competing political enti-
ties in keeping with the holdings of Castioni and Muenier.
52
Also, the criminal offense must be "in furtherance of," not
merely "in the course of" a political disturbance. 3
The location where a political offense occurs was further
elucidated in Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison."4 The
House of Lords, following the dicta of Schtraks, imposed a terri-
torial requirement and held that the fugitive must be at odds
with the state requesting extradition. Thus, as a Taiwanese na-
tional who was convicted of the attempted murder of a Chinese
Government official in New York, Cheng could not prevent his
extradition to the United States.
The political incidence test remains relatively intact since
land the court inferred the sailors would be charged with treason, a political crime. Id. at
550.
49. Id. at 551.
50. [1962] 3 All E.R. 529.
51. Schtraks lived in England and knew where his nephew was hidden in Israel. The
child was hidden from his parents so that he would be educated under Orthodox Jewish
principles. The extradition case in England grew into a large political debate in Israel.
Because of this resulting political furor in Israel, Schtraks requested a political offense
exception to extradition. The House of Lords decided that the offense in question did
not have political character because it was motivated by personal reasons and the politi-
cal dispute occurred after the fact. Id.
52. Viscount Radcliffe said :
in my opinion, the idea that lies behind the phrase "offense of a political char-
acter" is that the fugitive is at odds with the state that applied for his extradi-
tion on some issue connected with the political control or government of the
country. The analogy of "political" in this context is with "political" in such
phrases as "political refugee," "political asylum" or "political prisoner." It does
indicate, I think, that the Requesting State is after him for reasons other than
the enforcement of the criminal law in its ordinary, what I may call common or
international aspect.
Id. at 540.
53. SHEARER, supra note 15, at 170-71 (quoting Re Castioni [1891] 1 Q.B. 149).
54. [1973] 2 All E.R. 204. Cheng, a Taiwanese national was politically motivated to
attempt the murder of a government official from Nationalist China in New York. When
he fled to Great Britain the United States requested his extradition. He was extradited
because his political act was directed at Nationalist China, not at the state which re-
quested extradition. Id.
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Castioni's definition of an act of political character being one
committed "during the course of and in furtherance of a politi-
cal disturbance." It has been slightly refined by subsequent case
law in terms of acceptable types of political disturbances, as in
Muenier; what is incidental to a political disturbance, as in
Kolczynski; between whom the political disturbance must occur,
as in Schtraks; and at whom the offenses are directed, as in
Cheng. However, the subjective intent of the offender remains
excluded from consideration of whether an offense is a political
offense.
B. Ireland
The Irish Supreme Court has employed a variety of tests for
political offense since the enactment of the Extradition Act of
1965. The different tests result from the judiciary shifting its
emphasis among many elements which may comprise a political
offense."' Intrastate relations also have an impact on the judici-
ary's standards for the political offense exception. There is a no-
ticeable trend of judicial standards rising in accordance with
amiable state relations between the Republic of Ireland, Great
Britain and Northern Ireland. Conversely, judicial standards
have fallen when the legal system of Great Britain or Northern
Ireland is suspected of wrongdoing in the extradition process.
The mutability of the test for the political offense exception
stands in sharp contrast with Great Britain's steadfast political
incidence test.
The Supreme Court originally used a flexible standard to
determine political offenses 56 under the 1965 Act which evalu-
ated the motivation and objective of the alleged offender and the
context of the act.57 Employing this test, in the State (Magee) v.
55. Seven elements which the courts have considered in determining a political of-
fense: motive of the offender, purpose of the offender, target, nature of the conduct, the
political structure of the requesting state circumstances of the offense, motive of the
requesting state, and treatment of the returned offender. See Alpha Connelly, Ireland
and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 12 J.L. & Soc' 153, 156-69 (1985)
[hereinafter Connelly, Political Offense Exception].
56. Van Den Wijngaert calls this a "continental" approach which is less strictly ap-
plied than the "political incidence" test. The continental approach is a comprehensive
theory which lays stronger emphasis on subjective elements and examines other criteria
as well. Foremost, the continental approach is a flexible standard of interpretation. VAN
DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 3, at 119-26. For a general discussion of the "continental"
theories, see VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 3, at 120-26.
57. See Connelly, Political Offense Exception, supra note 55, at 173.
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O'Rourke"5 the Supreme Court refused extradition for a criminal
offense and expressed fear that extradition would result in the
defendant's prosecution for a political offense. 9 The political of-
fense exception was granted when the lack of evidence put forth
by the requesting government 0 was interpreted in a light most
favorable to the defendant."1 Additionally, a lack of good faith
was imputed to the Government of Northern Ireland. e2 This was
an early signal that the Court would scrutinize the motive of the
state requesting extradition.
The "connection" between a political offense and a related
offense6 3 was examined in Bourke v. The Attorney General.
6 4
Bourke helped a communist spy* escape from prison in Great
Britain. The spy's offense was found to be a pure political of-
fense since he escaped to resume espionage. Bourke's connected
offense was found to be criminal, but not political because he
did not share the spy's ideology. (Bourke helped the spy escape
because of a general sense of sympathy for him and a great dis-
like for the government which imprisoned them both.)6" The Su-
preme Court held that there were no legislative limitations on
which criminal offenses could be connected to political of-
fenses,6  and therefore the judiciary must interpret the connec-
58. [1971] I.R. 205, 207.
59. Northern Ireland requested the extradition of Magee for four common crimes
(housebreaking, use of an uninsured vehicle, malicious damage to property and assault).
Magee contended that he was actually wanted for questioning about a raid on the
Holywood military barracks in Northern Ireland since he had access to the barracks
before the raid. Id. at 207-09.
60. Although the Extradition Act of 1965 does not require a prima facie case to be
put forth by the requesting government, the Court here expected admittable substantia-
tion of the charges on the extradition warrant. Northern Ireland submitted evidence
which was not allowed as hearsay, and also claimed ignorance of easily discovered facts
relating to the charges on the warrant. Id. at 210.
61. The Court found it had no valid reason to disbelieve the uncontradicted evi-
dence of Magee. He admitted to IRA sympathies and involvement in the raid. In addi-
tion, Magee had been questioned several times by Northern Irish authorities about the
raid. Id. at 209-11.
62. The Court concluded that the extradition request was a pretense to obtain
Magee and try him for the raid on the military barracks which was a political offense. Id.
at 211.
63. Bourke v. The Attorney General, [1972] I.R. 36, 48.
64. [1972] I.R. 36.
65. Id. at 49-53.
66. Id. at 57-61. In the absence of a definition of a connected political offense, the
Supreme Court looked to the European Convention on Extradition for guidance, since
the Extradition Act of 1965 is based on this convention. That convention did not define
the term either, and an examination of the draft articles clearly showed that an exact
definition of connected political offenses was rejected and the term was purposely unde-
1992] 643
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tion in the most lenient manner.67 The Supreme Court found a
connection between the offenses because of the offenders' mu-
tual intent, evidenced by the fact that the same degree of plan-
ning is required to escape from prison and to help someone es-
cape from prison.68 As a result, a connection based on mutual
intent of the offenders was sufficient to grant the political of-
fense exception to extradition.6
There was a dramatic shift in the attitude of the Irish judi-
ciary following the 1973 Sunningdale Conference attended by
Ireland, Great Britain and Northern Ireland.7" The states issued
a communique addressing the increasing partisan violence in
Ireland and the propensity of the Irish judiciary not to grant
extradition.7 1 "It was agreed by all parties that persons commit-
ting crimes of violence in any part of Ireland, however moti-
vated, should be brought to trial irrespective of the part of Ire-
land in which they are located."7 2 In this atmosphere of
increased cooperation73 the seeds of the 1976 Criminal Jurisdic-
tion Act were planted. 4 Shortly afterwards the Irish Supreme
Court adopted more stringent test for political offenses and
voiced disagreement with IRA tactics.
A solely objective test for the political offense exception was
fined. The High Contracting parties were satisfied that "there should simply be a con-
nection between the offense in question and the political offense." Id. at 57. Further-
more, the Irish Parliament (which ratified the Extradition Act of 1965) never stipulated
that a connected offense must also be a political offense. Id. at 61.
67. The legislature "has left the connection to be spelt out by the Courts in the
widest possible manner." Id.
68. Id. at 62.
69. Id.
70. The Sunningdale Conference was held in December 1973 in Surrey, England.
See generally McCall-Smith, supra note 32, at 200.
71. Cantrell, supra note 46, at 801 ("The O'Rourke (Magee) decision, coupled with
the increasing terrorism of the seventies, prompted leaders of Ireland and Great Britain
to convene a conference at Sunningdale.") See also Alpha Connelly, Non-Extradition for
Political Offenses: A Matter of Legal Obligation or Simply a Policy Choice?, 17 THE
IRISH JURIST 59, 59-60 (1982) [hereinafter Connelly, Non-Extradition for Political
Offenses].
72. Joint Communique, December 1973 § 10.
73. The Sunningdae Conference also established a power sharing Executive and led
to an agreement to establish a Council of Ireland. McCall-Smith, supra note 32, at 209.
74. Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act, 1976; No. 14 of 1976. The Act allowed a state
to confer extraterritorial jurisdiction on another state instead of requesting extradition.
It was successfully used to prosecute a fugitive offender in the Tuite case. See William
Francis O'Brien, Irish Terrorists and Extradition: The Tuite Case, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J.
249, 260-72 (1983).
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articulated in McGlinchey v. Wren. 5 The Supreme Court held
that a crime was a political offense if a reasonable person
thought it was political activity.76 The "reasonable man" test
was an objective standard of interpretation which switched em-
phasis from the offender's motivation to an average person's
feelings about political crimes. 7 Motivation was disregarded be-
cause some crimes are so shocking to a normal person that they
"assuredly dishonor any cause that might have been espoused by
its perpetrators. 7' Furthermore, the Court rejected contentions
that IRA actions were implicitly political offenses because "mod-
ern terrorist violence . . . is often the antithesis of what could
reasonably be regarded as political.
79
Although Shannon v. Fanning0 involved the murder of po-
litical figures81 rather than civilians, it closely followed the
McGlinchey precedent. The Court described the murders car-
ried out by the IRA as "so brutal and cowardly that it would be
a distortion of language if they were to be accorded the status of
political offenses." ' More disapproval for the IRA was espoused
by the Court because they "abjured normal political behavior in
favor of violence. '"' s However, some members of the Supreme
Court voiced dissatisfaction with the "reasonable man" test but
did not reach a consensus for a new test.
8 4
75. [1982] I.R. 154. Northern Ireland requested McGlinchey's extradition from the
Republic of Ireland. He was wanted for the murder of an elderly woman during an IRA
raid on her home. McGlinchey admitted that he was a former IRA member and pro-
duced evidence that the IRA was responsible for the raid. Id. at 157-59.
76. Id. at 160.
77. The "reasonable man" test is like the "political incidence" test because they
both evaluate objective elements of the offense. However, under the "reasonable man"
test a very serious offense might be part of and incidental to a political disturbance but
would not be a political offense because a reasonable person would not regard it as politi-
cal activity. The moral and legal perspective are taken into consideration in the "reason-
able man" test. For further discussion see infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
78. McGlinchey, [1982] I.R. at 159.
79. Id. at 159.
80. [1984] I.R. 569.
81. Sir Norman Strong and his son had previously been members of the House of
Commons in Northern Ireland. They were murdered in an IRA raid on their home. Id. at
572.
82. The Court said it decided what constituted a political offense by viewing the
facts and circumstances of the crime in light of the standards and values existing in
Ireland at the time of the crime. Id. at 581.
83. Id.
84. Justice Hederman stated that the reasonable man test was too objective. He
suggested the decisive criteria for when a criminal offense becomes a political offense is
whether the perpetrator acted with a political motive or purpose. Id. at 587. Justice Mc-
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The political relationship of the British and Irish Govern-
ments was enhanced by the Supreme Court's extradition deci-
sions under the "reasonable man" test since it facilitated their
joint fight against terrorism. The pinnacle of relations between
the two states was reached in 1985 "Hillsborough" agreement"
where the Republic of Ireland was given a consultative role in
Northern Ireland's affairs"6 in return for promising to ratify the
multilateral 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism 8 7 to which Great Britain was a party.8 There soon
followed another change in the standard for the political offense
exception which immeasurably increased the difficulty of quali-
fying for the political offense exception.
The "constitutionality" test was first espoused in Quinn v.
Wren."' Under this test, a criminal offense which is found to be
unconstitutional activity"0 precludes the offender from receiving
the political offense exception. A unanimous Supreme Court
judgment held that the defendant's actions, undertaken to cre-
ate a thirty-two county workers republic (composed of Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland), "necessarily and inevitably
involves the setting aside of the Constitution." '91 Since the words
"political offense" in the Extradition Act of 1965 cannot be
given an unconstitutional meaning,9 2 the Supreme Court refused
to grant the political offense exception to extradition to an
Carthy proposed a new test which took into account the motivation and nature of the
offense, the identity of the victim and considered these factors in light of their proximity
to the overall political aim of the offense. Id. at 588. See Coln Campbell, Extradition to
Northern Ireland: Prospects and Problems, 52 MoD. L. REv. 585 (1989) at 598; see also
Connelly, Political Offense Exception, supra note 55, at 155.
85. Also known as the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement.
86. The Republic of Ireland's Constitution claims sovereignty over the entire island,
including Northern Ireland. See IR. CONsT. arts. 2 & 3.
87. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ.
T.S. 90 (entered into force Aug. 4, 1978), discussed supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
88. Previously, Ireland had refused to ratify this treaty because it automatically ex-
cluded some offenses from the political offense exception to extradition. This exclusion
was thought to infringe upon Ireland's sovereign right to deny extradition. See Connelly,
Non-Extradition for Political Offenses, supra note 71.
89. [1985] I.R. 323.
90. In this case Great Britain requested extradition of Quinn on charges of fraud.
Quinn admitted he was a member of INLA whose purpose was to establish "a thirty-two
County Workers Republic by force of arms." Id. at 328. He further stated that he fraud.
ulently deceived the bank in order to obtain funds for the INLA to use in their cam-
paign. Id. at 327-35.




INLA 3 member whose purpose was to "facilitate the overthrow,
by violence, of the Constitution and the organs of the State
therein. '
The Supreme Court extended the constitutionality test to
exclude persons with unconstitutional objectives from the politi-
cal offense exception in Russell v. Fanning.9 5 The objective of
the IRA to reunite Northern Ireland with the existing Republic
of Ireland was found unconstitutional because under the Consti-
tution,9 only authorized organs of the state could take actions
toward achieving reintegration.9 7 Therefore, the IRA objective to
attempt the reunification of Ireland "without the authority of
the organs of the state established by the Constitution is to sub-
vert the Constitution and usurp the function of government."98
Two dissents which questioned the extent of the judiciary's
role in extradition matters and the conduct of the government
receiving extradited offenders foreshadowed the demise of this
strict standard for the political offense exception. Justice Heder-
man thought Russell's escape was connected to the political of-
fense for which he was imprisoned.99 He wrote that since IRA
activity was directed outside the Court's jurisdiction, it did not
threaten the Republic of Ireland and was not unconstitu-
tional.10° Additionally, he wrote that only the legislature may say
armed rebellion in Northern Ireland amounts to armed rebellion
in the Republic of Ireland. 101 In a separate dissent Justice Mc-
93. Irish National Liberation Army.
94. Quinn, [1985] I.R. at 337.
95. [1988] I.R. 505. Russell was part of a mass escape from the Maze prison in
Northern Ireland during which a prison guard died. Northern Ireland sought his extradi-
tion the charge of attempted murder. Id. at 507. Russell claimed the charge in the war-
rant was a political offense because he escaped prison to resume IRA activities which
would reunify Ireland and establish the Irish Constitution as "the sole governing princi-
ple of the political structure and organization of the entire island of Ireland." Id. at 511.
For this reason Russell thought his case was distinguished from Quinn where the objec-
tive was the overthrow of the government of the Republic of Ireland and usurpation of
its constitution. Id. at 516.
96. Article 6, §§ 1 & 2; Russell, [1988] I.R. at 530.
97. Russell, [1988] I.R. at 530.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 542, 554. Russell was imprisoned for the attempted murder of a Northern
Ireland Policeman. He disclaimed involvement in the offense, but asserted it was the
work of the IRA of which he was a member. Id.
100. Id. at 530.
101. Cf. Cheng discussed supra, note 54. The majority's reasoning in Russell was an
inverse of the Cheng territoriality requirement that the offender must be at odds with
the state requesting his extradition. In Russell the relationship of the offender and the
state granting extradition was scrutinized. Russell, 2 All E.R. 529, 539.
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Carthy expressed doubts about the treatment by Northern Irish
authorities of extradited offenders1 0 2 and expressed concern
about Northern Ireland's lack of reciprocity upon receiving ex-
tradited offenders.10 3 Justice McCarthy cited breaches of the
reciprocity principle following the extraditions of McGlinchey'
0 4
and Shannon. 05
In January 1987 the Republic of Ireland ratified the 1977
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in the
Extradition Act of 1987.106 This new extradition agreement be-
tween member states of the Counsel of Europe both narrowed
1 07
and expanded 08 the political offense exception. However, it was
not retroactive and several cases remained to be decided under
the Extradition Act of 1965. In these remaining extradition
cases, the majority of the Supreme Court expressed doubt about
the good faith of the Northern Ireland government and reversed
its stance on the constitutionality of IRA objectives. As a result,
the standard for political offenses was eased and subjective ele-
ments, such as motive, were readmitted to consideration.
The related cases Finucane v. McMahon 0" and Clarke v.
McMahon110 were decided by the Supreme Court on March 13,
102. Six other men who participated in the prison escape with Russell were mis-
treated during their recapture, and deprived of clothing when they were returned to
prison. McCarthy criticized the Northern Irish authorities for not punishing those who
inflicted this mistreatment. Russell, [1988] I.R. at 555-56.
103. Under the doctrine of reciprocity both the requesting government and the ex-
traditing government will observe the guidelines in the extraditing country's extradition
act. Id. at 557.
104. McGlinchey was handed over to the RUC (Royal Ulster Constalbury) on March
17 and was questioned by police until March 19 when he was finally arraigned in court.
Under the Extradition Act of 1965 arraignment must take place as soon as possible after
extradition. Id. at 555-56.
105. Shannon was interrogated following his extradition about other crimes than the
one for which he was extradited. He was also subjected to an untimely delay before he
was arraigned. These are both breaches of the Extradition Act of 1965. Id. 555-558.
106. No. 1 of 1987 [IR].
107. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ.
T.S. 90 (entered into force Aug. 4, 1978), Article 1, § 3 (offenses involving automatic
weapons and bombs are exempt from the political offense exception). Article 2 gives each
state the option whether to regard other violent crimes as political offenses. Id. § 3.4.
108. Extradition to the United Kingdom is not permitted where there are grounds
for believing the warrant was issued because of race, religion, nationality or political
opinion. Id. §§ 8 & 9.
109. Additionally, the Attorney General must be satisfied that the requesting state
has demonstrated a prima facie case against the defendant. Extradition (Amendment)
Act 1987, § 2(1). Finucane v. McMahon, [1990] I.R. 165.
110. [1990] I.R. 228.
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1990.111 Finucane was imprisoned for weapons violations and
Clarke was imprisoned for attempted murder when they escaped
from jail in Northern Ireland during a mass breakout. During
the breakout a guard was stabbed and shortly thereafter died.
The men fought extradition on two grounds: (1) that under sec-
tion 50(2) of the Extradition Act of 1965, their offenses were po-
litical offenses or offenses connected to political offenses, and (2)
that under article 40(2) of the Constitution, extradition was
likely to result in their mistreatment.
In a complete reversal of recent decisions, the Supreme
Court overturned Russell1 2 and held that IRA objectives are
constitutional." 3 Relying on Bourke'1 4 as precedent, the prison
escapes by Finucane and Clarke were found to be "closely con-
nected" to the political offenses for which they were impris-
oned."15 The unanimously upheld civil liberties claims of the of-
fenders' lends further significance to these cases. Finucane and
Clarke alleged that extradition would lead to their mistreatment
in prison. 17 The Court agreed that the defendants' civil rights
would be at risk if extradited because other prisoner's civil
rights were flagrantly disregarded after the prison escape. In
support of this conclusion, the court discussed the remaining
prisoners who were assaulted by prison guards and bitten by
dogs, and then refused medical treatment for ten days by prison
111. Finucane and Clark were similar cases and the Supreme Court used Finucane
as the leading case. Both men were imprisoned IRA members in Northern Ireland; Finu-
cane was convicted of weapons violations, and Clarke was convicted of attempted mur-
der. Finucane and Clarke escaped during a mass breakout in which a prison guard was
stabbed and died shortly thereafter. Finucane, [1990] I.R. at 222. Northern Ireland is-
sued warrants for their extradition from the Republic of Ireland.
112. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
113. The Supreme Court said it wrongly decided in Russell that the objectives of
the IRA are unconstitutional. This has the effect of discriminating against IRA members
rather than evaluating the nature of their offense. However, the Supreme Court did not
overturn Quinn where the judgment rested upon the activities of the INLA, which were
found to be unconstitutional. Finucane, [1990] I.R. at 224-25.
114. In Bourke the Supreme Court found that there simply must be a connection
between a political offense and a connected offense to qualify them both as political
offenses. See supra notes 63-66.
115. Finucane, [1990] I.R. at 217.
116. Article 40 of the Republic of Ireland's Constitution protects the rights of all
Irish citizens, whether they are subjects of Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland.
This is consistent with Articles 2 & 3 of the Constitution which claim sovereignty over
the island of Ireland, including Northern Ireland. See IR. CONST. [Constitution of The
Irish Free State (Saorstdt Eireann) Act, 1922] arts. 2, 3 & 40.
117. A prison document fixed blame for the stabbing on Finucane. Finucane and
Clark feared retribution if they were returned to prison.
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authorities. The Supreme Court was most disturbed by the apa-
thetic response of Northern Ireland's Government which never
disciplined the prison guards for their abuse of power. 118
Under Finucane and Clarke, the constitutionality issue as it
pertains to objectives is rejected as a barrier to the political of-
fense exception. By implication, the Supreme Court has ac-
cepted the IRA as a political organization so long as its activities
do not threaten the Republic of Ireland. Additionally, the scope
of inquiry into elements of the political offense exception is ex-
panded by admitting motivation and anticipated treatment of
the returned offender into consideration. These cases demon-
strate that the Supreme Court questions the reciprocity of the
British and Northern Irish governments in extradition cases, as
well as the judicial mechanism of these countries. Against this
backdrop of events, the extradition case of Owen Carron was
decided.
IV. CARRON V. MCMAHON
A. Facts
In December of 1985, Owen Carron was driving his car in
Northern Ireland with James Maguire as a passenger. "" Maguire
had an assault rifle and fifty-eight rounds of ammunition in his
possession. 2 Carron denied knowledge of the gun and ammuni-
tion when the Royal Ulster Constalbury stopped the car and ar-
rested both Carron and Maguire.
121
Carron was a member of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the
Irish Republican Army.122 As a Sinn Fein candidate, he was
elected a Member of British Parliament from 1981 to 1983.123 In
court, Carron denied that he supported the use of violent means
118. In Pettigrew v. Northern Ireland Office, a Northern Ireland court awarded
damages for injuries suffered by a prisoner at the hands of guards in the same escape.
Pettigrew v. Northern Ireland Office, [1989] 3 B.N.I.L. 83.
119. Carron v. McMahon, [1990] I.R. 239.
120. Id. at 265.
121. Id.
122. Kieran Cooke, Irish Court Refuses Fresh Extradition, FIN. TIMES (Eng.), Apr.
7, 1990, § 1, at 1. The origins of Sinn Fein and the IRA are discussed in PHILLIPS, supra
note 23, at 53-54 & 125-27.
123. Carron was the parliamentary election agent for Bobby Sands, the imprisoned
IRA hunger striker who was elected MP. Sands died from his hunger strike in 1981,
causing a by-election won by Carron. Edward Gorman, Ex-MP at Centre of Latest Mael-
strom, THE TIMES (Eng.), Apr. 7, 1990, § Home News.
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to achieve political change in Northern Ireland. 12 Maguire also
denied being an IRA member, however, he averred in an affida-
vit to the Supreme Court that his political objective was to
achieve political change in Northern Ireland through violent
means. 125 The High Court and Supreme Court both concluded




Carron fled to the Republic of Ireland after being released
from custody on bail.127 He was subsequently arrested by the
Republic of Ireland's police, and the authorities in Northern Ire-
land issued two warrants for his extradition. 128 Carron sought to
escape extradition and raised two claims in his defense. 2" Under
the Extradition Act of 1965, Carron claimed he was charged with
political offense or offenses connected with political offenses. 13°
Under the Irish Constitution, Carron claimed his detention was
unlawful because his extradition would result in treatment
which would deprive him of his constitutional rights. 3'
B. High Court Decision
The High Court held that Carron did not qualify for a polit-
ical offense exception. 3 2 Using Justice McCarthy's proposed test
(espoused in Shannon), the true motivation of the perpetrator,
nature of the offense, and identity of the victim were considered
in light of the desired political goal. 133 The court concluded Car-
ron's crime was not a political offense since Carron claimed he
had no knowledge of the weapons within his car, nor any moti-
vation for a political goal to be achieved through his criminal
offense. 34 Absent these elements, the Court concluded that Car-
124. Carron, [1990] I.R. at 266.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 240, 270.
127. Gorman, supra note 123, § Home News.
128. The warrants related to charges of possession of a firearm and ammunition
with intent to endanger life or cause serious injury to property and possession of a fire-
arm and ammunition under circumstances which give rise to the reasonable suspicion
that they were not in possession for a lawful object. Carron, [1990] I.R. at 265.
129. Carron raised only the § 50 claim in district court and failed to prove his case.
Id.
130. § 50 of the Extradition Act of 1965. Id.
131. Article 40 of the Republic of Ireland's Constitution. Id. at 267. The article 40
claim was upheld in Finucane, see supra notes 116-17.
132. Carron, [1990] I.R. at 240.
133. See Shannon v. Fanning, [1984] I.R. 569, 588.
134. Carron, [1990] I.R. at 257.
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ron's criminal offense was not a political offense.1"5
Similarly, the court did not find Carron's criminal offense to
be an offense connected to a political offense. This was because
Maguire's offense was unconstitutional and, therefore, not a po-
litical offense.136 Maguire's offense was considered unconstitu-
tional based upon the court's "reasonable inference" that, in
light of his admitted objective of reintegrating Ireland through
violence, Maguire possessed the gun and ammunition for the
purpose of causing serious injury to the British forces in North-
ern Ireland. 137 Therefore, not only did Maguire have unconstitu-
tional objectives under the Russell standard, but the gun and
ammunition pointed to unconstitutional activity under the
Quinn standard as well.138 The political offense exception was
also not available to Carron since his criminal offense was con-
nected to Maguire's criminal, not political, offense.1 39
Finally, the High Court found that Carron did not discharge
the burden of proof that his constitutional rights would be vio-
lated if he was extradited to Northern Ireland.1 40 The High
Court concluded that the chance of a violation was improba-
ble14 1 and found Carron to be an "unreliable witness" to events
which supported his constitutional claim.
4
-
During the time the High Court decision was under appeal,
the Supreme Court handed down rulings in Finucane and
Clarke which invalidated Russell, and held that IRA objectives
are constitutional. The Finucane decision was potentially influ-
ential on the Carron case because the High Court found
Maguire's offenses unconstitutional and, therefore, nonpolitical
under Russell. However, the Quinn holding that political activi-
ties committed to subvert the constitution and usurp the func-
tions of government are unconstitutional remained good law.
43
135. Id.
136. Id. at 258.
137. Id. at 259.
138. Id. at 258.
139. Id. at 259.
140. Id. at 263.
141. Id. at 262, 263.
142. Carron was considered unreliable by the High Court because of discrepancies
between his written affidavit and oral testimony, which Carron blamed on the transcriber
of the affidavit. Id. at 262.
143. Id. at 267.
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C. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that Car-
ron's offense was not in itself a political offense.144 This conclu-
sion was reached through an examination of Carron's motive and
intent for the criminal offense. 45 Carron's denial of knowledge
of the gun and ammunition in his car and his lack of a political
objective negated the possibility that his was a political
offense. 46
A different conclusion was reached regarding whether Car-
ron's crime was a connected political offense. The Supreme
Court declared that a connected offense did not need to be "po-
litical [in] nature" to be connected with a political offense.' 4 In-
stead, the test of a connected offense was "whether there is a
causal or factual relationship of sufficient strength to be prop-
erly described as a connection between the two offenses con-
cerned."''48 Evaluation of the two elements "causal or factual re-
lationship" and "of sufficient strength" does not explicitly take
the intent or motive of the connected offense into account.
Applying this new test, the first consideration is whether
the nature of Maguire's offense renders it a political offense.
Consistent with Finucane and Clarke, the Court held that
Maguire's "intention to engage in paramilitary activity"'149 was
not an unconstitutional objective.' 50 As an IRA member,
Maguire had a political objective for transporting weapons. Fur-
ther, the weapons had not been used in a context excluded from
the political offense exception, such as constitutionally subver-
sive'"' or unreasonable political'52 activity.5 3 For these reasons
the Supreme Court found that Maguire's offenses were political
offenses.
Next, the Supreme Court found "the closest possible con-





149. Id. at 267.
150. Russell's conclusion that "evidence of a political objective to expel the British
forces out of Northern Ireland by force of arms is not a subversion or usurpation is
overturned by Finucane." Id. at 267. See David McKittrick, Trend of a Decade Over-
turned by New Approach of Judges, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 7, 1990, § Home News, at 3.
151. The Quinn standard remains good law in Carron.
152. The McGlinchey standard remains good law in Carron.
153. Carron, [1990] I.R. at 267.
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nection between the offenses of which James Maguire was con-
victed and the offenses with which the applicant is charged.'
154
This finding could only be based on their nearly identical actus
reus since Carron was found to be without mens rea for either a
political or criminal offense.155 Therefore, similar actus reus
must qualify as "a causal or factual relationship of sufficient
strength" to connect a criminal offense to a political offense.
D. Analysis
In response to mounting concerns about the good faith, reci-
procity and judicial systems of Northern Ireland and Great Brit-
ain in extradition cases, the Irish Supreme Court has rethought
its strict position on political offenses. A new view has mani-
fested itself in the success of civil liberties claims and lower
standards for the political offense exception as methods to deny
extradition. The standard is lowered by admitting many new el-
ements of the crime charged into consideration and subjecting
them to lenient evaluation for the political offense exception. Al-
though these are distinct defenses to extradition, the lowered
standard is intertwined with the civil liberties approach because
both are concerned with treatment of the returned offender. 156
Thus, in addition to admitting more elements of the crime into
consideration of the political offense exception, undoubtedly the
judiciary is also concerned with the well being of the offender. In
Carron, these considerations lead to the finding of a connected
political offense for a man who did not even know he committed
a crime.
While the Carron decision may appear to eradicate any
standard for the political offense exception, several restraints re-
main intact to prevent the exception from swallowing the rule.
Furthermore, this low standard is not an act of bad faith on the
part of the Irish judiciary toward Great Britain and Northern
Ireland in extradition hearings. The judiciary's only duty is to
fairly try extradition cases under any standard they select.
Given that this standard espoused in Carron was discriminating
and the case was carefully decided, this duty has not been
breached.
Concern for the individual is one of the traditional bases of
154. Id. at 266.
155. Id.
156. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 3, at 2.
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the political offense exception as it anticipates poor treatment of
an extradited political offender. 157 This is because an individual
who has challenged the political order in the requesting state is
a likely target for discrimination when tried by the government
of the requesting state.158 Therefore, the motive and judicial
procedures of the requesting state may provide reason to grant
the political offense exception. Justice Walsh of the Irish Su-
preme Court defended this position in a recent decision:
Our statutory provisions do not permit the courts to ignore the
motive of the requesting state or the fairness of the procedure
by refusing to consider the treatment the fugitive will receive if
returned. Neither should our courts ignore the answerability of
the State to the organs of the European Convention of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms if a fugitive offender is
handed over to any other State ... where the courts are not
satisfied that his treatment there would not be in breach of the
rights protected by the Convention.159
Justice Walsh's opinion points out that the link between human
rights and the political offense exception has the potential to re-
inforce the political offense exception as it is increasingly re-
stricted by international agreements aimed against terrorism.160
The Irish judiciary has been concerned with judicial mecha-
nisms of the Governments of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land because of events which cast doubt on their good faith.
Where such events have occurred, the Irish judiciary has a pat-
tern of responding by broadening the political offense exception.
Elements of bad faith were found in Magee'6' and a broad ruling
157. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 3, at 2.
158. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 3, at 2.
159. Finucane v. McMahon, [1990] I.R. 165, 216.
160. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). This human
rights convention may provide a loophole for the 1987 Extradition Act which absolutely
excludes certain offenses from the political offense exception. The Irish Courts are espe-
cially able to benefit from this potential loophole as the Republic of Ireland was the only
signatory of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism not to sign arti-
cle 13 which requires a prima facie case before extradition. (The 1987 Extradition Act is
based on the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.) Since the Irish
judiciary has lost power to determine political offenses because of restricted offenses
under the treaties, and they have also lost power because the Republic of Ireland's exec-
utive and legislature did not sign article 13, the courts may turn to the human rights
convention as a way to deny extradition.
161. See The State (Magee) v. O'Rourke, [1971] I.R. 205.
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in Bourke soon followed. Similarly, in Finucane,62 the Court
discussed at great length examples of bad faith on the part of
British authorities after the extraditions of McGlinchey and
Shannon and the sympathetic decision in Carron followed
within a month.
The Supreme Court evaluated the motive of Northern Ire-
land's government in Magee. Extradition was requested for sev-
eral common crimes, but the lack of evidence during the trial
pointed to a hidden motive of wanting to charge the defendant
with political crimes. Thus, the extradition of Magee was denied
on the basis of bad faith.163 Northern Ireland also displayed bad
faith in terms of reciprocity after the extraditions of McGlinchey
and Shannon. They deviated from normal extradition procedure
and waited two days before arraigning McGlinchey upon his re-
turn to Northern Ireland. Similarly, when Shannon was extra-
dited, Northern Ireland delayed his arraignment and then ques-
tioned him about crimes other than those for which he was
extradited.
164
The issue of unfair judicial procedures in Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, also influences the Irish judiciary. In North-
ern Ireland suspected terrorist crimes, including offenses com-
mitted by extradited IRA members,16 5 are tried in Diplock
courts. 16 6 These courts were created by the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act of 197367 to avoid partisan jury
verdicts."8 Ironically, however, they have the potential to permit
the Government of Northern Ireland to discriminate against a
162. See Finucane, [1990] I.R. 165.
163. The Court found that Magee was likely to be charged with political offenses if
extradited. Magee, [1971] I.R. 205, 211-12.
164. See Finucane, [1990] I.R. 165. In international law the principle of specialty is
observed in extraditions. It says that a person may not be tried for a crime other than
the one for which the person was extradited. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783
(9th Cir. 1986).
165. Two IRA members were extradited from Holland to Northern Ireland in 1986.
Kelly and McFarland were subsequently tried and convicted before a Diplock court on
charges of escape from prison, murder, and their remaining prison sentences. Campbell,
supra note 84, at 608.
166. Diplock Courts are nonjury courts presided over by a single judge who applies
special rules of evidence. More than 85% of all convictions are based on a statement or
confession. Michael P.P. Simon, The Political Offense Exception: Recent Changes in
Extradition Law Appertaining to the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1988 ARIz. J. INT'L &
CoMp. L. 244, 258.
167. Campbell, supra note 84, citing the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Act 1973.
168. Simon, supra note 166, at 258.
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limited class of republican offenders because the judge who
solely decides the question of fact and law and determines the
offender's guilt,169 is also from Northern Ireland. This problem
led the Irish legislature to seek changes in Northern Ireland's
judicial system before signing the 1987 Extradition Act.170
The failure to reform this court system has led to a general
consensus among the Irish public that Irish citizens receive un-
fair trials; the Irish Judiciary reflects this consensus.'1 ' Two con-
troversial cases in Great Britain have exacerbated the mistrust
of British courts; the Birmingham Six and the Guilford Four
cases confirmed that Irish citizens were unfairly convicted in
British courts. 2 Furthermore, extradited offenders may be sub-
jected to intense interrogation under the Prevention of Terror-
ism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989.'7 This Act allows
seven days of detention without criminal charges for persons
suspected of terrorist offenses in Northern Ireland.174 The Irish
judiciary has condemned the act as "devoid of any legal basis in
international law.' 75 Similarly, the European Court of Human
Rights has found the act to be in derogation of the covenant of
the European Convention on Human Rights.7 6
In light of these concerns, the civil liberties of Irish citizens
169. JOHN JACKSON ET AL., CALLED TO COURT, A PUBLIC REVIEW or CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN NORTHERN IRELAND 165-67 (1991).
170. Campbell, supra note 84, at 608.
171. McKittrick, supra note 150. One prominent commentator has concluded that
the Irish Courts are reflecting the fact that Irish people generally do not have much
confidence in the British justice system. Additionally, one Irish Attorney General refused
to extradite Ryan to Great Britain because he believed a fair trial was impossible. Camp-
bell, supra note 84, at 612.
172. The "Guilford Four" and "Birmingham Six" cases involved pubs which were
bombed in Great Britain. In both cases the Irish defendants' convictions were based on
forced confessions and police misconduct. Years later, both cases were reversed and the
defendants were freed. The Guilford Four convictions were overturned in 1989. Connie
Maxwell, Amnesty Criticizes Britain's Criminal Justice Sustem, UPI, June 8, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The Birmingham Six convictions were
overturned in 1991. R. v. McIlKenny & Others [1992] 2 All E.R. 417.
173. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989.
174. Id.
175. Finucane v. McMahon, [1990] I.R. 165, 215. The imprecise definition of "ter-
rorism" and the restricted territory to which the act applies (Northern Ireland) makes
this an "ad hoc definition for the purpose of detaining persons" suspected of terrorism.
There is no corresponding offense of terrorism, so this act allows persons to be detained
and then interrogated about other crimes.
176. Brogan & Others v. U.K., 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988). This court held
that the seven day detention power of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provi-
sions) Act 1989 violates article 5(3) of the Convention.
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have become a major consideration in extradition cases. 177 The
civil liberties element of extradition cases is evaluated in light of
the Irish Constitution, rather than the Extradition Act of
1965.17'8 Past instances of prisoner mistreatment have become a
basis for denying extradition where an offender's civil rights may
be violated in the requesting country's penal system. The dis-
sent by Justice McCarthy in Russell expressed concern for the
treatment of the defendant because six prisoners who escaped
with the defendant were mistreated upon their recapture and
deprived of clothing. 7 9 Potential mistreatment in prison was
also one ground for denying extradition in the Finucane and
Clarke cases. There the Court was influenced by the circum-
stances which followed Finucane's and Clarke's escape from the
Maze prison. The remaining prisoners in Maze were beaten, bit
by guard dogs and then refused medical treatment. In addition,
no prison guard was ever disciplined for these actions. 180 Based
on their concern about mistreatment, the Court decided these
cases solely on its own authority, but was also influenced by a
Northern Ireland Court decision in which the wrongful behavior
of prison guards following the escape of a prisoner was recog-
nized and the plaintiff, an unescaped prisoner, was awarded
damages.''
In response to these concerns the Irish Supreme Court has
become willing to consider more elements of the criminal offense
in determining whether to grant the political offense exception.
These elements, such as political objective and intent, are simi-
lar to those originally considered under tests for the political of-
fense exception in the early extradition cases decided under the
1965 Act. Some of these elements were considered in Carron to
determine the nature of the primary and connected offenses. Ad-
ditionally, a renewed trend of reducing the scrutiny of the de-
fendants' credibility emerges in Carron.
The credibility of the defendant seeking extradition has
been closely scrutinized under the more restrictive tests for the
177. See Pettigrew v. Northern Ireland Office, [1989] 3 B.N.I.L. 83, discussing Finu-
cane and Clark.
178. Article 40, § 4, subsection 2 of the Republic of Ireland's Constitution says the
Constitution protects the civil rights of all Irish citizens.
179. Russell v. Fanning, [1988] I.R. 505, 554-55.
180. Finucane v. McMahon, [1990] I.R. 165, 219-21; Clarke v. McMahon, [1990] LR.
228, 236-38.
181. See Pettigrew, [1989] 3 B.N.I.L. at 83 (the cause of action in this case arose out
of the same prison escape and was persuasive to these decisions).
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political offense exception, but was lightly considered under the
more lenient standards of recent cases. For example, under the
narrow "reasonable man" test, the Court in McGlinchey and
Shannon did not believe the defendants' claims of noninvolve-
ment in their respective crimes. 1as Similarly, the Court was re-
luctant to believe defendants who admitted involvement in
crimes which they claimed were perpetrated for the IRA.183 In
contrast, the early Magee decision was decided under the lenient
"continental test" and the Court held that the defendant was to
be believed in the absence of contradictory evidence." Simi-
larly, in Carron, the High Court found Carron's claim of igno-
rance of the gun and ammunition in his car to be credible.
8 5 It
stated that they "must deal with the actual and not the hypo-
thetical facts surrounding the alleged offense."'8 6 Likewise, the
Supreme Court did not speculate about the matter other than to
restate Carron's assertion of ignorance.8 7 The easy acceptance
of Carron's credibility is one of many signs that the Court has
returned to a very lenient standard.
Motivation, in particular republican' political objectives,
has been reintroduced as an element of the crime considered in
Irish extradition cases. 8" Under the two preceding tests for the
182. McGlinchey v. Wren, [1982] I.R. 154, 159-60; Shannon v. Fanning, [1984] I.R.
569.
183. Hanlon v. Fleming and Maguire v. Keane were pre-Russell decisions where the
defendants applied for the political offense exception claiming their offenses were com-
mitted on behalf of the IRA. Hanlon had explosives in his London apartment and the
Supreme Court found that there was no "acceptable evidence" that the explosives were
for the IRA's use. Hanlon v. Fleming, [1981] I.R. 489. In Maguire, the Supreme Court
affirmed a trial judge's decision that the defendant gave contradictory testimony and did
not prove that the train robbery was for the benefit of the IRA. Maguire v. Keane, [1986]
ILRM 235, 236-37.
184. The Supreme Court stated that the President of the High Court "had no valid
reason to disbelieve the uncontradicted testimony of Magee. This Court, in my view is in
the same position." The State (Magee) v. O'Rourke, [1971] I.R. 205, 211.
185. Carron v. McMahon [1990] I.R. 239, 257. If Carron did know about the weapon
and ammunition in his car's trunk, their presence in that context would point to a possi-
ble political objective. A political objective would not have jeopardized Carron's case
under Finucane, so in actuality, Carron's credibility is a moot point.
186. Id. at 257.
187. Id. at 266.
188. Republican is a descriptive term for those groups which seek a reunited Repub-
lic of Ireland. Loyalist, on the other hand, is a descriptive term for groups which seek the
continuance of British rule in Northern Ireland.
189. "Being a member of the IRA does not by itself disqualify any activity of a
member from the political offense exception." Finucane v. McMahon, [1990] I.R. 165,
210.
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political offense exception, the Court would not consider politi-
cal objectives in its determinations. The "constitutional test"
denied the political offense exception to a defendant with the
IRA's political objectives. The "reasonable man" test was
strictly objective, therefore a subjective factor like the defend-
ant's political objective was not considered for the political of-
fense exception.190 By reversing itself and allowing political
objectives to be considered in extradition cases, the Supreme
Court has recognized the IRA as a political group and broadened
the scope of its inquiry.' 9'
This wider inquiry into political objectives worked to Car-
ron's favor when Maguire's offense was examined for political
nature. Carron himself claimed he had no political motivations
for possessing the weapon and ammunition. 92  However,
Maguire's admitted political objective, 9 s along with his posses-
sion of a weapon, led the Supreme Court to conclude that
Maguire committed a political offense. Subsequently, Carron's
criminal' offense qualified for the political offense exception by
virtue of its connection to Maguire's political offense.
The High Court's decision in Carron reintroduced intent as
an element in determinations of the political offense exception.
Intent for a political crime is separate from the motivation for
the crime. 94 It is argued that in a true political crime the politi-
cal motivation must dominate the intent of the offender to com-
mit the crime and outweigh the significance of the common
crime.'95 Intent was not a factor for consideration under the
"reasonable man" and the "constitutional" tests for the" same
reasons political motivation was not a factor under those tests.
The last time intent was closely examined in determining the
political offense exception was the 1971 Bourke case, which the
190. Justices Hederman and McCarthy both wrote in their opinions in Shannon
that motivation should be considered in determining the political offense exception.
Shannon v. Fanning, [1984] I.R. 569, 587-88. No agreement about this was reached and
instead of broadening the test for the political offense exception in future cases, the more
restrictive constitutional test was instituted.
191. As a political group the IRA may still engage in unconstitutional behavior
under Quinn, but the courts will evaluate this on a case by case basis. Finucane, [1990]
I.R. at 210.
192. Carron v. McMahon [1990] I.R. 239, 257.
193. Maguire averred that his political objective was to reintegrate Ireland through
force. Id. at 258.
194. See Connelly, Political Offense Exception, supra note 55, at 156-57.
195. Cantrell, supra note 46, at 781 (quoting BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: Tan LAW OF PUBLIC ORDER 250 (1969)).
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Supreme Court used as precedent in its Carron decision.
By implication, Carron has established intent as an element
for consideration in the primary offense which does have to exist
in the connected offense. The High Court drew a "reasonable
inference" that Maguire's intent was to cause serious injury to
British forces in Northern Ireland. 96 The Supreme Court agreed
with this inference about Maguire's intent and found that the
sum of the elements considered indicated a political offense.
Carron was found not to have intent for the criminal offense by
virtue of his ignorance of the weapon. But the Supreme Court
made its unlikely conclusion that a political offense may be con-
nected to a concurrent criminal offense on the basis of "a causal
or factual relationship of sufficient strength." '197 Since Carron
did not have mens rea, the Supreme Court is asserting that such
a relationship may exist solely on the basis of similar actus reus.
Therefore, while intent is a consideration in fixing the nature of
the primary offense, it is not a required element in the con-
nected political offense.
The Supreme Court relied on the broad Bourke decision to
find Carron's connected crime qualified for the political offense
exception. However, an examination of mens rea in both crimes
reveals Carron as a broader holding. In Bourke, the offenses of
aiding a prisoner escape from prison and escaping from prison
were considered "complimentary offenses" which were practi-
cally "a single operation."' 9 An escape planned by two parties
requires agreement of mens rea, so Bourke clearly had a criminal
motive although he lacked a political motive.9 9 Carron can be
distinguished in that Carron's ignorance of the weapon and am-
munition meant he had neither a criminal nor a political motive.
Without a consideration of mens rea, "a factual or causal rela-
tionship of sufficient strength" between Carron's and Maguire's
offenses can only be based on similar actus reus. Thus, the out-
come of their offenses is solely determinative of a connection be-
tween the crimes. In this manner, Carron's crime, while devoid
of criminal mens rea, is colored by the political attributes of
Maguire's offense as a simultaneous event.
196. A reasonable inference of intent was drawn when weapons possession was con-
sidered in light of Maguire's political objective. Carron, [1990] IR. at 259.
197. Id. at 266.
198. Id. (quoting Bourke v. The Attorney General, [1972] I.R. 36).
199. Bourke knew he was committing a crime in helping the spy escape prison, but
he was not acting out of political motivation. Id.
1992]
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This does not necessarily mean the new test for a connec-
tion is grossly inclusive of any simultaneous criminal activity.
The most serious types of criminal activity are prevented from
qualifying for the political offense exception. Specifically, the
holdings of McGlinchey and Quinn will discourage unreasonable
or unconstitutional political acts. These have been interpreted
respectively as civilian murders and attempts to overthrow the
government of the Republic of Ireland. This is a reasonable re-
striction because these activities are the furthest removed from
expelling British forces from Northern Ireland and pose the
greatest threat to civilians.
There is the possibility that the low standard for a con-
nected political offense set in Carron is overly inclusive of less
serious criminal offenses. To use a modified Bourke scenario as
an example, suppose an unwitting taxi cab driver was hailed in
front of the prison and gave the spy a means to escape. The taxi
cab driver would then be able to claim that his actions were con-
nected to a political offense. This is solely based on simultane-
ous time and place of occurrence of the offenses. But these acts
are also connected because the political offender (the spy)
manipulated the action of the criminal offender (the taxi cab
driver) to implement his own political offense. The criminal of-
fender's ignorant state of mind is incorporated into the political
offender's mens rea for the political offense.
It is doubtful that a "relationship of sufficient strength" be-
tween a political offense and an unwitting criminal offense
would exist without this element of manipulation. To return to
our example, suppose a large commotion followed the spy's es-
cape and a prisoner seized the opportunity to steal from others
while they were distracted. The outcome of the prison escape
did not depend on the theft and thus the offenses are not
strongly connected from an objective perspective. Nor are they
strongly connected from a subjective perspective because there
has been no incorporation of the mental states. Instead, these
are two remotely related offenses which are unlikely to support a
connection which would qualify both as political offenses.
While the test for a connected political offense in Carron
was potentially overly inclusive, it is likely that the Supreme
Court was motivated to institute a low standard because of its
concerns that Northern Ireland would view Carron's offense as a
political offense and therefore, Carron would not be treated
fairly if extradited. Since Maguire's offense was considered a po-
[Vol. XVIII:2662
CARRON v. McMAHON
litical offense and he was imprisoned in Northern Ireland, it is
not unlikely Carron's extradition would have resulted in a simi-
lar fate. Accordingly, there was a great possibility that an unfair
trial would follow extradition because Carron's political motive
was disputed by Northern Ireland;200 although, the Supreme
Court found Carron's denial credible. 10' It is questionable
whether the Northern Irish Government was interested in Car-
ron's political opponent status as a member of Sinn Fein or Car-
ron's criminal offense. If the former is the case, the "political"
nature of the offense may come from the motive of the request-
ing state rather than from the actions of the offender. 2  There-
fore, it is possible that the Irish Supreme Court found a political
connection between the two offenses because a court in North-
ern Ireland might also see a political connection and use it
against the offender. A very broad interpretation of a connected
political offense counteracts the likelihood that an individual
will be treated unfairly in the requesting country.
20 3
The Irish Supreme Court has not breached the principle of
pacta sunt servanda by adopting a low standard for connected
political offenses. 204 The 1965 Extradition Act only requires that
a state fairly try an extradition case under the standard it
chooses to adopt.20 5 The good faith principle has not been
breached because the Irish judiciary has upheld its duty to exer-
cise discretion in selecting and applying a standard. Since pri-
mary political offenses are subject to reasonable standards and
there are compelling reasons for lowering the standard for the
connected political offense,20 6 the Supreme Court has lived up to
200. Id. at 268.
201. Id.
202. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 3, at 2; Connelly, Political Offense Excep-
tion, supra note 55, at 167.
203. "Irish legal and political attitudes are coloured by history but also by a judg-
ment on the quality of the system to which suspects are handed over;" McKittrick,
supra note 150. "Irish law is too squeamish about civil liberties; the British lock up the
innocent with the guilty;" Brian Cathcart, Spanner in the Anglo-Irish Works: The Irish
and Extradition, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 15, 1990, at 17.
204. Pacta sunt servanda is a customary principle in international law that treaties
will be honored. IAN BROWNLE, PRINCILES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 496 (1966).
205. The Extradition Act of 1965 is based on the European Convention on Extradi-
tion. Under the European Convention's article 3(1), a state may apply objective or sub-
jective criteria as it thinks best to determine a political offense. As long as the state
applies their chosen criteria in good faith, it is not answerable to other states for its
decision. See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 2, at 37.
206. The connected political offense is implicitly subject to the same reasonable
standards as the primary offense. This is because the primary offense first must pass the
1992]
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its word not to treat extradition as foreign policy despite politi-
cal and diplomatic pressures to do so.207 The current trend in
extradition cases is grounded in international law as concern for
the individual is recognized justification for granting the politi-
cal offense exception.
V. CONCLUSION
The Irish Supreme Court has not failed to exercise discre-
tion in choosing and interpreting the term political offense in
Carron v. McMahon. Recently, it has returned to a broad test
for a political offense which hinders extradition. In addition, it
has devised an even broader test for an offense connected to a
political offense. This new test for a connected political offense
as formulated in Carron is criticized as too objective and overly
inclusive. However, these flaws were necessary to protect the of-
fender from unfair treatment by the requesting government.
It is unlikely that this recent trend in extradition cases will
change because the Irish judiciary is determined to preserve the
political offense exception. Only a successful system of trial in
the requested country, or recourse for breaches in the treatment
of returned offenders in an international court of law may bal-
ance the competing interests of the requesting and requested
countries in extradition. In the absence of such effective mea-
sures, the Carron decision has aggravated relations between the
Republic of Ireland and Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
there are calls to abandon the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement
which represented a high point in diplomatic relations. 08
Pamela Loughman
"reasonableness" test before the connected offense is subject to the broader test for con-
nection between the offenses.
207. Finucane v. McMahon, [1990] I.R. 165, 216.
208. See Simon Lee, Law: Don't Blame the Irish Judges, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr.
13, 1990, at 19.
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